Sembcorp's Comments/suggestions on Draft CERC (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024

Overall comment

At the outset we want to highlight that DSM Regulations had been modified recently in Dec'22 and further modified vide order no 01/SM/2023 on 6th Feb'23. Such modifications in DSM Regulations have made the DSM bands stricter for all sources including wind and solar. This has significantly increased the DSM penalties on the already commissioned projects by more than 3 times compared with 2014 DSM Regulations (ranging between 0.6% to 1.5% of gross annual revenue). As per proposed DSM bands these penalties again expected to increase, please refer the table below for the actual impact for 3 of our large-scale wind projects:

DSM Penalties as % of Annual Revenue

Project	2014 Regulations	2022 Regulation	Feb'23 Order	Draft Regulation 2024
Wind Project -1	0.43%	6.46%	1.52%	2.51%
Wind Project -2	0.23%	2.42%	0.96%	1.63%
Wind Project -3	0.22%	1.87%	0.57%	1.26%

The changes in DSM bands has already resulted in a substantial decline in project profitability (with a decrease in IRR ~1% which is significant). New projects can include such modifications in their tariff bids, however, the existing projects where tariff is fixed such further tightening of DSM bands would further worsen their profitability.

The only mitigation measure for fully complying with the stricter DSM framework is to improve the forecasting methodologies, which have not seen significant technological improvements in the recent past. It is also to be noted that post notification of DSM regulation 2022, a committee under the chairman, CEA has been constituted to asses the forecasting accuracy and suggest measures for improvement. The committee is still working on this aspect.

It is thus emphasized that any further tightening of deviation bands for existing projects is hampering projects returns substantially as these projects have been awarded through competitive bidding and thus does not have any margin to absorb such loss of revenue. The explanatory memorandum suggests that aggregation of schedules at the ISTS pooling substation has been allowed as per the IEGC and this would result in improvement in overall deviations and resultant DSM charges payable by generators. However, no analysis of possible impact of aggregation has been provided. The benefit of such aggregation at the ISTS pooling station is not sufficient to compensate the adverse impact of the proposed change in the deviation bands.

Comments/suggestions on Draft CERC (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024

Detailed clause-wise comments

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1.	8. Charges for Deviati	on		8. Charges for Deviati	on	i.In the proposed DSM Regulations, there is no
			seller other than an F	tion, in respect of a general RoR generating station or a	receivable amount to general seller in case of over injection	
	generating station bas or WS seller shall be a	sed on municipal solid vas under:	vaste	generating station bas or WS seller shall be a	sed on municipal solid waste as under:	beyond 10% or 100 MW whichever is less when the frequency is <50.10 Hz. It is
	100 MW, whichever is	eyond [10% DGS or s less] and f within and		100 MW, whichever is	eyond [10% DGS or s less] and f within and	pertinent to note that, in a day there are instances wherein
	outside f band	Deviation by way of		outside f band	Deviation by way of	frequency in a time block goes
	Deviation by way of over injection	Deviation by way of under injection		Deviation by way of over injection	Deviation by way of under injection	below 50 Hz (in fact it goes even below 49.90 Hz), during
	(Receivable by the Seller)			(Receivable by the Seller)	(Payable by the Seller)	such instances higher is the deviation in terms of over-
	i) Such seller shall	(ii) Such seller shall		i) Such seller shall	(ii) Such seller shall	injection sellers will provide
	be paid back @	pay @ RR when [f ≥		be paid back @	pay @ 85% of RR	higher support to bring the frequency back to normal
	zero when (f < 50.10 Hz):	50.00 Hz]; (iii) @ 150% of RR		zero when (f < 50.10 Hz):	when [f ≥ 50.00 Hz]; (iii) @ 150% of RR	range. Thus, is requested that
		when [49.90Hz ≤ f		Provided such	<u>-</u>	irrespective of the deviation
	Provided that such	<50.00 Hz]; and		seller shall be paid	<50.00 Hz]; and	volume, general seller should
	seller shall pay @	(iv) @ 2000(of DD		back @ 115% of	(i.) @ 2000(at DD	get paid for over injection for supporting the grid when
	10% of RR when [f ≥ 50.10 Hz]	(iv) @ 200% of RR when [f < 49.90 Hz]		RR when (f < 50Hz):	(iv) @ 200% of RR when [f < 49.90 Hz]	frequency is <50Hz.
				Provided that such		ii.Further, as per proposed DSM Regulations, the payable
				seller shall pay @ 10% of RR when [f		amount by general seller is @
				≥ 50.10 Hz]		100% of RR in case of under
				-		injection beyond 10% or 100
						MW whichever is less when the

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			frequency is above 50.05Hz. It is pertinent to note that, in a day there are instances wherein frequency in a time block goes above 50 Hz, during such instances general seller should be incentivized for under injection irrespective if volume is under injection is within or beyond 10% as the seller is supporting the grid by way of under injection.
			iii.Due to the limitations of real- time monitoring and response to small grid frequency deviations (0.1 Hz). The power plants are also not that dynamic to react based on such minor frequency changes. It is therefore requested that instead of small steps of 0.1 Hz the incentive and penalty mechanism be framed as per slabs of 0.5 Hz each. This will enable the market participants to take appropriate action based on prevailing frequency
2.	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	and the providing moduling
			It is noted that the proposed DSM
	(4) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a WS Seller	(4) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a WS Seller	bands have reduced the initial
	being a generating station based on wind or solar	being a generating station based on wind or solar	band i.e. VLws (1) from earlier:

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ļ		lar resources, including such		solar resources, including such	`
ļ	generating stations a	ggregated at a pooling station	generating stations	aggregated at a pooling station	Hybrid)
ļ	through QCA shall b	be without any linkage to grid	through QCA shall	be without any linkage to grid	• 15% to now 10% (Wind)
ļ	frequency, as under:		frequency, as unde	r:	
ļ					Post 2014 DSM Regulations,
	Deviation by way over injection (Receivable by the Seller) (i) for VL _{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (ii) for VL _{WS} (2) @ 20% of contract rate;	under injection (Payable by the Seller) v) for VL _{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (vi) for VL _{WS} (2) @	Deviation by way over injection (Receivable by Seller) (i) for VL _{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (ii) for VL _{WS} (2) @	under injection (Payable by the Seller) v) for VL _{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (vi) for VL _{WS} (2) @	there has been some improvement in forecasting and scheduling. And developers have been able to reduce forecasting errors significantly. However, most of this improvement has happened in
	90% of contract rate (iii) for VL _{WS} (3) @ 50% of contract rate, (iv) beyond VL _{WS} (@ Zero;	rate; (vii) for VL _{WS} @	90% of contract ra (iii) for VL _{WS} (3) @ 50% of contract rate, (iv) beyond VL _{WS} @ Zero;	rate; (vii) for VL _{WS} @ 150% of contract	deviation range of >20% (i.e. VLws (3) and beyond). If we analyze data for the existing projects, in more than 85% of time blocks error remains within ±10% for solar and hybrid, and ±15% for wind. Increasing the
ļ		Tate.	Nietas Valous a Liusit	- () N/O O - II	accuracy of forecasting within
	Note: Volume Limits	for WS Seller:	Note: Volume Limit		this range would require
ļ	-	Volume Limit	WS Seller	Volume Limit	significant technological
		VL_{WS} (1) = Deviation up to	A generating	VL_{WS} (1) = Deviation up to $\frac{5\%}{10\%}$ 10% D_{WS}	breakthrough on forecasting
	station based on solar or a hybrid	$VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation up to 5% D_{WS}VL_{WS}(2) = Deviationbeyond 5% D_{WS} and up to 10% D_{WS}$	station based on solar or a hybrid of wind-solar resources or	VL_{WS} (2) = Deviation beyond 5% 10% D _{WS} and up to 10% 15% D _{WS}	tools as well as access to highly accurate weather data. It is therefore requested that till the time it is established that

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no.	aggregation at a pooling station	VL_{WS} (3) = Deviation beyond 10% D_{WS} and up to 20% D_{WS}	aggregation at a pooling station	VL_{WS} (3) = Deviation beyond $\frac{10\%}{15\%}$ D _{WS} and up to 20% D _{WS}	such technology and access to precise weather data is available, further tightening of
	A generating station based on wind resource	VL_{WS} (1) = Deviation up to 10% D_{WS} VL_{WS} (2) = Deviation beyond 10% D_{WS} and up to 15% D_{WS} VL_{WS} (3) = Deviation beyond 15% D_{WS} and up to 25% D_{WS}	A generating station based on wind resource	VL _{WS} (1) = Deviation up to $\frac{10\%}{10\%}$ 15% D _{WS} VL _{WS} (2) = Deviation beyond $\frac{10\%}{10\%}$ 15% D _{WS} and up to $\frac{15\%}{20\%}$ 20% D _{WS} VL _{WS} (3) = Deviation beyond $\frac{15\%}{20\%}$ 20% D _{WS} and up to 25% D _{WS}	DSM bands may not be undertaken especially for the existing projects.
3.	8. Charges for Dev	viation	8. Charges for Deviation		It may be noted that if the
	(c) depooling of device connected to the point methodology mutual QCA and such individuals	` ,	(c) depooling of deconnected to the positive methodology approximately agreed up individual WS seller NLDC shall submive eks notification of the Commission.	nit the methodology within 4 of these regulations for approval	mechanism for de-pooling of deviation charges is kept as per mutual agreement between individuals, it will delay the process and will result in multiple litigations in future. For streamlining the aggregation process it is important that uniform methodology should be applicable and the same should be issued by CERC or Grid-India.
4.	purchase of power 62 or adopted unde	means the tariff for sale or , as determined under Section r Section 63 or approved under f the Act by the Appropriate	purchase of power 62 or adopted under	means the tariff for sale or , as determined under Section er Section 63 or approved under of the Act by the Appropriate	Under GEOA, substantial capacity is being planned under captive or third-party route. In these cases, tariff is not

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	Commission or the price as discovered in the Power Exchange, as the case may be; and in the absence of a tariff or price as above, contract rate shall mean the weighted average ACP of the Day Ahead Market segments of all Power Exchanges for the respective time block;	Commission or the price as discovered in the Power Exchange, or tariff agreed between the bilateral parties as the case may be; and in the absence of a tariff or price as above, contract rate shall mean the weighted average ACP of the Day Ahead Market segments of all Power Exchanges for the respective time block;	determined as per Sec 62 or 63 and is mutually agreed between the parties. Such tariff should also be considered as contract rate for the purpose of computing DSM penalties. Otherwise, such projects under GEOA will be penalized with DSM charges on the basis of exchange tariffs while the similar projects u/s 62 or 62 DSM charges are computed on contract rate.
5.	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	Treatment of DSM on drawl
			should be as applicable to the
	(5) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a Standalone Energy Storage System (ESS), shall be at par with the charges for Deviation for a general seller other than an RoR generating station or a generating station based on municipal solid waste or WS seller as specified in Clause (1) of this Regulation	(5) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a Standalone Energy Storage System (ESS), shall be at par with the charges for Deviation for a general seller other than an RoR generating station or a generating station based on municipal solid waste or WS seller as specified in Clause (1) of this Regulation. Provided that for drawl of power while charging the standalone ESS the applicable deviation charges shall be at par with Buyer.	Buyer.
6.	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	The very purpose of co-located
			ESS with WS seller is to reduce
		(6) Charges for Deviation, in respect of an ESS colocated with WS Seller(s) connected at the same	the variability of the WS

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	 (6) Charges for Deviation, in respect of an ESS colocated with WS Seller(s) connected at the same interconnection point, shall be as follows: i) Such seller shall provide a separate schedule for WS and ESS components through the Lead generator or QCA at the interconnection point; ii) Deviation corresponding to WS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for WS 	interconnection point, shall be at par with the WS seller to which it is co-located with as follows: i) Such seller shall provide a separate schedule for WS and ESS components through the Lead generator or QCA at the interconnection point; ii) Deviation corresponding to WS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for WS Seller being a generating station based on solar or	component and increase the stability of the grid. Now if the ESS component will be treated like a general seller it will further increase the DSM of the project making it economically less viable to add this component. It will further discourage RE
	Seller being a generating station based on solar or hybrid of wind-solar resource in accordance with clause (4) of this regulation; and iii) Deviation corresponding to the ESS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for a standalone ESS in accordance with clause (5) of this regulation.	hybrid of wind-solar resource in accordance with clause (4) of this regulation; and iii) Deviation corresponding to the ESS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for a standalone ESS in accordance with clause (5) of this regulation.	generators to add ESS component in a WS project for meeting the objective of minimizing the deviations.
7.	10. Schedule of Payment of charges for deviation (1) The payment of charges for deviation shall have a high priority, and the concerned regional entity shall pay the due amounts within 7 (seven) days of the issue of the statement of charges for deviation by the Regional Power Committee, failing which late payment surcharge @ 0.04% shall be payable for each day of delay.	10. Schedule of Payment of charges for deviation (1) The payment of charges for deviation shall have a high priority, and the concerned regional entity shall pay the due amounts within 7 (seven) days of the issue of the statement of charges for deviation by the Regional Power Committee, failing which late payment surcharge @ 0.04% shall be payable for each day of delay.	With past experience we have experienced that 7 days are not enough for making payments for DSM charges. And now with added validation of details to be complied by QCA the time provided for making the payment be increased to 10 days as against proposed 7 days.
8.			A significant portion of new RE projects are being planned to sell power on exchange.

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			Further there is a difference in
			scheduling flexibility between
			selling through the exchange and
			via PPAs.
			◆PPAs: Allow revisions of
			schedule 7/8 time-blocks
			ahead of actual delivery.
			Power Exchange: Does not
			allow revision in Day ahead
			schedule.
			To understand the issues,
			consider a scenario where an RE
			projects have scheduled 100
			MW on the exchange under
			GDAM (with Day ahead
			schedule). On the other hand, a
			buyers have scheduled 100 MW
			on exchange. Now suppose RE
			project does not get adequate resource and generates only
			80MW (i.e. actual injection)
			whereas buyers draw complete
			100MW. In this case, only 80 MW
			of RE power was generated,
			whereas the buyer gets certified

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			that it has purchased 100 MW of
			RE power.
			To address this issue, RE power
			should be allowed to revise the
			schedule 7/8 time-blocks ahead
			of actual delivery. In such a case
			schedule of Buyers should also
			be revised on proportionate
			basis.
			Keeping the same DSM bands
			for exchange sale without the
			flexibility to revise the schedule
			may not be appropriate for RE
			projects. This will restrict the
			development of RE merchant
			capacity in the country. In order
			to develop a robust RE exchange
			market such issue needs to be
			addressed.